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Abstract 
It has been suggested that the extent to which a person maintains attention to pleasant versus 
unpleasant aspects of a given stimulus has an effect on the self-reported affective state. This 
assumption was empirically tested in two experiments. In Study 1, participants received the 
instruction either to focus on a positive emotion-eliciting event (winning a tournament chess 
game) or to focus their attention on an affectively neutral distraction task (describing drawings). 
Study 2 used negative performance feedback in a cognitive task to induce unpleasant affect, and 
included three experimental groups (waiting condition, continuing with the same cognitive task, 
distraction with a different cognitive task). Results converged to show that distracting attention 
away from the emotion-eliciting event leads to a shorter duration of the emotional experience. 
These findings support the attention-focus hypothesis. 
(131 words) 
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Out of mind, out of heart: Attention affects duration of emotional experience 
To the surprise of psychologists and lay people alike, even dramatic life-events such as 
winning a lottery or not getting tenured as a professor do not seem to affect our self-reported 
emotional state for very long (Frederick & Loewenstein, 1999; Gilbert, Pinel, Wilson, Blumberg, 
& Wheatly, 1998). This phenomenon of returning quickly to one’s prior level of emotions after 
experiencing positive or negative events has been labeled the hedonic treadmill (for an overview 
see Frederick & Loewenstein, 1999). There are various explanations for this effect. The classic 
account is based on Adaptation Level Theory (Helson, 1964), which posits that the experience of 
an event shifts the adaptation level by establishing a new setpoint, thus changing the level of 
stimulation that is perceived as neutral. Similarly, habituation may lead to desensitization, i.e., a 
diminished subjective intensity in the experience of a stimulus.  
Different to Helson’s model of a neutral setpoint, Diener, Lucas, and Scollon (2004) 
suggest that typically the setpoint is not neutral, leading to the fact that most people experience 
positive emotions most of the time. This notion is consistent with self-reported affective 
reactions to standardized stimuli, which reliably show a tendency towards appetitive responding 
to calm stimuli (Cacioppo & Gardner, 1999). It also extends to physiological measures of 
emotional reactivity that suggest stronger appetitive engagement in most situations characterized 
by low or moderate arousal (cf., positivity off-set, Caccioppo, Gardner, & Berntson, 1997). Not 
surprisingly, then, most people feel happy most of the time (Diener & Diener, 1996). 
Returning to the phenomenon of the hedonic treadmill, the question remains why the 
effects of even big events such dissipate rather quickly. Gilbert and colleagues (1998) have 
proposed that a “psychological immune system” helps through various cognitive strategies such 
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as downward social comparisons to cope with negative events much more efficiently than we 
might expect. Their research has focused on the gap between the expected and actual duration of 
events and suggests that people do not take their “psychological immune system” into account 
when predicting the affective impact and duration of events. One of the reasons for the 
inaccurate prediction of the affective duration is focalism. Focalism refers to the phenomenon 
that people tend to focus on the emotion eliciting event when predicting their future feelings 
instead of taking other hassles and uplifts of everyday life into account that will also influence 
their emotional state (Gilbert et al., 1998). Implicit in the notion of focalism is that the actual 
emotional experience at any given point in time is determined not only by the severity of one 
event but an integration of the various events a person encounters.  
Various theoretical accounts in the tradition of the adaptation level model suggest 
complex models of this integration. Most of these models assume a weighted average of past 
events, and some also assume that the weight increases with recency (e.g., Hardie, Johnson, & 
Fader, 1993). The current paper posits a more parsimonious account to such integration models, 
namely the attention-focus hypothesis. In short, the attention-focus hypothesis claims that the 
duration of the emotional experience in response to events is crucially determined by the 
attention they receive. In other words, events are expected to influence people’s self-reported 
affective state as long as they attend to them.  
The role of attention for emotion  
Most theories converge to suggest that emotional experience is a function of past events 
and a complex set of cognitive and physiological processes that can be viewed as being part of 
the emotional response to the situation, as posited by network models of emotion (e.g., Lang, 
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1993). The question arises whether the cognitive processes associated with temporal change in 
affective experience can be experimentally characterized. In this report, we examine changes of 
self-reported affect when manipulating the attentional focus to be on versus away from an 
engaging event.  
Although the role of selective attention for modulating responses to emotional stimuli has 
been at the core of psychophysiological and experimental studies, the hypothesis that time 
dynamics of emotional experience are affected by attention focus has not yet been systematically 
tested. One of the areas having adopted an attention-focus hypothesis is research on emotion 
regulation. In fact, there appears to be widespread agreement among researchers of emotion 
regulation that whatever is in the focus of attention influences emotional experience. Eisenberg, 
Fabes, Nyman, Bernzweig, and Pinuelas (1994, p. 110) summarize as one of the core 
assumptions of theories of emotion regulation that “regulation frequently involves attentional 
processes (such as attention shifting and attention focusing…)” According to Gross (2002), the 
deliberate deployment of attention is highly relevant for generating, maintaining, or altering an 
emotional response. For instance, when watching a movie about painful surgery, focusing 
attention on the surgeon’s glasses rather than the blood gushing from the patient’s wound should 
decrease people’s experience of negative emotions. In a study by Gross, Richards, and John 
(2008), participants reported using attentional deployment (looking away) in about 40% of 
remembered everyday episodes in which they attempted to alter their emotional experience. 
Work in clinical psychology has used a more direct approach in investigating the effect of 
distraction – i.e., focusing one’s attention away from an emotion-eliciting event – versus 
rumination on subsequent emotional experience. It is often argued that such a distraction process 
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is intrinsically similar to mechanisms induced during cognitive behavioral interventions. For 
instance, Fennell, Teasdale, Jones, and Damlé (1987) found that distraction (i.e., concentrating 
on a series of slides depicting outdoor scenes) reduced the frequency of self-reported depressed 
mood in patients low in endogenous depression. Conversely, in a sample of patients with major 
depression, Nolen-Hoeksema and Morrow (1993) found that depression symptoms increased 
when ruminating (i.e., focusing attention on the causes and consequences of a given problem) 
whereas depression ratings decreased during distraction. In a non-clinical group, Joormann and 
Siemer (2004) induced either positive or negative affect with film clips and then manipulated the 
focus of cognitive elaboration (internal/rumination versus external/distraction). As expected, 
sadness when watching a sad film decreased more slowly when participants were instructed to 
focus their attention on their own emotions, symptoms, or self, than when distracting attention 
away from the sad content. Brain electrophysiology also has suggested that shifts of attention 
from arousing to non-arousing aspects of the same visual scene reduces markers of emotional 
engagement (Hajcak, Dunning, & Foti, 2009). This does not imply, however, that emotions can 
only be elicited when the stimuli are in the focus of attention: Intense emotional stimuli elicit 
measurable physiological and self-report changes even when outside the focus of spatial 
attention (Keil, Moratti, Sabatinelli, Bradley, & Lang, 2005), or when competing with a 
distracting task (Müller, Andersen, & Keil, 2008). 
How can these two sets of findings be reconciled? On the one hand, keeping attention on 
negative thoughts as is found during rumination seems to prolong negative emotional states. On 
the other hand, emotional stimuli can elicit emotions even when they are outside the focus of 
attention. A potential mechanism mediating the results reviewed above is the duration of specific 
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aspects of the emotional response. One hypothesis that is consistent with both (a) rapid 
emotional engagement in response to intense stimuli and (b) reduction of such a response by 
distraction is that the duration of emotional experience after an engaging event depends on the 
attentional focus. Although attention might not be crucial for eliciting an emotional response, the 
emotional experience lasts longer when keeping attention on the event than when distracting 
attention away from the affective stimulus. Studies in the field of emotion regulation suggest that 
rumination leads to increased and prolonged experiences of negative emotions. Rumination, 
however, includes thinking about the role of the self for the negative events and, according to 
Nolen-Hoeksema’s research, appears to exacerbate negative thinking. The current report 
examines effects of attention focus on the duration of emotional reactions to positive events 
occurring in a natural situation (i.e., winning in a chess tournament, Study 1). Study 2 examines 
the effects of distraction on displeasure evoked by providing negative performance feedback on a 
cognitive task. Study 1 uses two experimental conditions (focusing attention vs. distraction), 
Study 2 comprises three conditions (waiting condition, continuing with the “failure” task, 
switching to a different task). As an initial and preliminary test of the attention-focus hypothesis, 
a pilot study was conducted. Based on the literature reviewed above, we predicted that 
distraction would shorten the duration of both pleasurable and aversive experience.  
Pilot Study and Study 1: Attentional Focus and Duration of Positive Affect 
Pilot Study 
Methods 
Sample. The sample consisted of N = 15 students at the University of Zurich (20 - 45 yrs, 
M = 26; 13 females).  
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Procedure and measures. After giving informed consent, participants filled out a brief 
demographic questionnaire and a measure of their current affective state. Pleasure/displeasure 
was assessed using a visual analogue scale (VAS) with a frowning face (indicating maximum 
displeasure) on one end and a smiling face (indicating maximum pleasure) on the other of a 20 
cm horizontal line. Pleasure and displeasure was then scored relative to the midpoint, resulting in 
a scale ranging between -10 (extreme displeasure) and 10 cm (extreme pleasure). The question 
read “How unhappy / happy are you right this moment?” Then, participants solved the 
embedded pictures test (Witkin et al., 1971), which was introduced as a test of visual spatial 
abilities. All participants received highly positive feedback on their performance independent of 
their actual performance. Immediately after that, participants indicated their current affective 
state (manipulation check). Then, participants were assigned randomly either to the attention 
focus or the distraction condition. In the attention focus condition, participants were asked to 
write down what the positive feedback meant to them and how they felt about it. In the 
distraction condition, participants were asked to describe how to get from one place to another on 
a map that was set before them. In both conditions, participants were asked five times after an 
interval of 90 seconds each to indicate their current affective state. Participants were thanked and 
debriefed. They received course credit for participation.  
Results 
 The two experimental groups did not differ in their baseline affect (T(13) = 1.91, n.s.). 
The manipulation of positive affect was successful as indicated by a significant increase in 
positive affect after receiving the positive feedback of task performance (F(1,13) = 4.63, p = 
.05). This effect did not differ between experimental groups (interaction experimental group x 
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pre-post affect: F(1, 13) = 0.007, n.s.). A repeated measures ANOVA revealed a statistical trend 
for an interaction between experimental group and affect over time (F(5, 60) = 2.04; p < .09). As 
expected, distracting attention from the positive event (feedback on good performance) led to 
faster decline of positive affect than focusing attention on the event (see Figure 1, panel A).   
Study 1: Chess Study 
The pilot study provides preliminary support of the hypothesis that attentional focus 
impacts the duration of the emotional experience. Study 1 aimed at replicating this effect in a 
naturalistic environment using a personally meaningful event. Moreover, Study 1 used a different 
distraction task so as to rule out that the effects of the pilot study are due to the specific 
distraction task. 
Method 
Participants. 60 participants of a chess tournament held in Zurich, Switzerland, 
volunteered after their match to take part in the study. The majority of the chess players were 
male (56 men; 18 - 73 yrs, M = 46.17). Eight players had to be excluded because the match had 
ended undecided and a second round was scheduled. Twelve participants had lost the match, 
which resulted in a very small group size of six participants in each condition, too small for 
further analyses. Thus, this experiment focused on the winning experience. N = 40 participants 
who reported having won the previous match were included in the final analyses (21 in the focus 
condition, 96.7% male; 19 in the distraction condition, 90% male). 
Procedure and measures. Outside of the tournament room, two research assistants 
waited for the contestants and asked them if they were willing to participate in a short study. The 
procedure was the same as in the pilot study with the exception of the emotion induction. Here, 
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the positive event was winning the previous game of chess. After giving informed consent, 
participants filled out a brief demographic questionnaire and a measure of their current affective 
state using the same scale as in the pilot study. Participants were then randomly assigned to the 
attention-focus or the distraction condition. In the attention-focus condition, participants were 
asked to write down what winning the previous chess match means to them, and how they felt 
about it. In the distraction condition, participants were asked to describe drawings of 
arrangements of simple geometrical figures (triangles, squares, lines). Pilot testing had indicated 
that describing these drawings does not affect affective state. In both conditions, participants 
were asked seven more times after an interval of 60 seconds each to indicate their current 
pleasure/displeasure on the visual analogue scale. Participants were thanked and debriefed. As 
compensation for their participation, they received sweets (chocolate bars, gummi bears) and 
entered a raffle for 20 book vouchers worth 15 Swiss Franks ($15 at the time).  
Results 
The experimental groups did not differ in their baseline affect (T(38) = -0.30, n.s.). A 
repeated measures ANOVA revealed a significant interaction of experimental group and affect 
over time (F(7, 266) = 4.48; p < .001; pEta2= .10). As expected, distracting attention from the 
positive event (i.e., the success in the previous chess game) led to faster decline of positive affect 
than focusing attention on the event.  
Study 1 shows that the preliminary results of the pilot study can be replicated using a 
positive real-life event such as the winning a match in a chess tournament. People who focus 
their attention on the success report feeling better for longer periods of time than people who 
distract their attention away from it. Study 1 did not allow testing if the results also hold for 
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negative feelings. This was the main question of Study 2. As a further experimental control, 
Study 2 also included a waiting group along with the attention-focus and distraction groups 
Study 2: Negative Feedback in a Cognitive Task 
Method 
Participants. A total of 54 undergraduate students participated in the study, and were 
given class credits or a small financial bonus for their participation. Their mean age was 24.2 
years; 29 were female. Participants gave written informed consent prior to and debriefed after the 
experimental session. Distribution of gender in the three experimental groups was equal. 
 Procedure and measures. All participants began the session (time 1) by indicating their 
present level of pleasure/displeasure on a visual analogue scale (VAS), as described for Study 1. 
Then all participants worked on a version of the continuous performance task (CPT), which 
required identification (key press) of repetitions of all elements in a 3-by-3 visual array that 
contained random combinations of all special signs available on a QWERTY keyboard. 
Participants were asked to respond as fast and accurate as possible, whenever they detected a 
change. Stimulus arrays were displayed for 800 ms followed by 400 ms of black screen and then 
by the next array. Feedback was given after blocks of 20 trials (i.e., after 24 seconds), and was 
designed to be negative in all three groups: Participants were shown a bar graph showing false 
feedback on their own performance in relation to the overall group’s performance, accompanied 
by one of the following text labels, shown at the bottom of the bar graph: “satisfactory,” 
“acceptable,” “inadequate,” “unacceptable.” Feedback bars varied to randomly indicate values 
between 2% and 28% performance. It was explained to participants that this reflected a 
compound score of their accuracy and speed, indicative of their ability concentrate and function 
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well cognitively. 40 blocks of trials were run in total. Immediately after completion of the CPT 
(time 2), all participants indicated their affective state on the VAS again. They were then 
randomly assigned to three different groups: (1) waiting condition (participants stayed in a 
waiting area for 20 minutes with no books/journal/magazines, TV or other media available); (2) 
attention focus condition (participants continued to work for 20 minutes on the same CPT task 
and presented with false feedback of cumulative scores ranging between 2% and 28%, 
supposedly reflecting their previous and present performance; (3) distraction group (participants 
worked for 20 minutes on another computer task involving sorting and matching incoming 3-
dimensional elements to gaps in a reference surface, alike the popular 1990s game Tetris; no 
feedback was provided). After completion of this block, all participants indicated their affective 
state on the self-report measures for a third time (time 3). 
Results 
A 3 (group) x 3 (time) ANOVA indicated that the time course of affective self-report 
across the three measurement points differed for the three groups (F(4, 102) = 4.53; p < .01). 
When examined for the time points separately, the experimental groups did not differ in their 
baseline affect (F(2, 51) = 1.1; n.s.), nor was there a group difference after the CPT feedback 
phase (F(2, 51) = 0.1; n.s.). However, after the manipulation groups differed (F(2, 51) = 9.8; p < 
.01; pEta2 = .24), indicating that distracting attention from the negative event (here: engaging in a 
different computer task) led to a greater increase in reported pleasure than focusing attention on 
the event (T(34) = 3.9; p < .01), or waiting (T(34) = 3.1; p < .01). Importantly, waiting and 
maintaining the attention focus did not differ (T(34) = 1.4; n.s., see Figure 1, panel c).  
Discussion 
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Three experiments provide first empirical support for the hypothesis that the duration of 
an emotional experience depends on the attentional focus. The present set of studies represents 
an empirical test of the long-standing assumption in research on emotion regulation (e.g., 
Eisenberg et al., 1994) that, as of yet, has not been tested directly. The results of the present 
studies suggest that positive and negative emotional experiences tend to be shorter when 
attention is distracted away from it. The studies provide converging evidence using different 
emotion-eliciting events (Pilot study: positive performance feed-back; Study 1: winning a real-
life chess game in a tournament; Study 2: negative performance feed-back) and different tasks 
used for distraction (Pilot study: describing directions on a map; Study 1: describing geometrical 
drawings; Study 2: engaging in a different task). Whereas each of the individual studies does not 
provide sufficient evidence to make a strong case for the attention-focus hypotheses, their results 
converge across independent samples and different tasks.  
One of the limitations of the chess studies is that we did not assess the time since the 
match. It might be that some of the participants had already engaged in some kind of emotion 
regulation that might have brought them back to their affective setpoint. Contestants were asked 
immediately after they left the tournament room if they were willing to participate in the study. 
As we wanted to minimize the time between the match and the study, we limited our questions to 
the bare minimum. Unfortunately, we did not assessed the time since the match was finished. 
Nevertheless, results suggest that focusing attention on the match lead to better mood that was 
maintained longer compared to the distraction task. This result is in line with the attention-focus 
hypothesis. 
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An interesting question is if distraction leads to a change in affect or if focusing attention 
leads to a maintenance of affect. Inspection of Figure 1 suggests that both is the case. In Study 1 
(chess study), focusing on the positive event increased mood while distraction kept it on a 
significantly lower level. Study 2 (negative performance feedback) showed that distraction 
increased positive mood while focusing attention on the failure task kept the mood on the same 
low level as directly after receiving the negative feedback. Attending to an emotion-eliciting 
stimulus, then, seems to intensify the emotion to some degree (chess study) or keep it at the same 
level (pilot study, negative feedback study). Future studies are needed to investigate under which 
conditions an attention focus intensifies and under which it maintains the level of emotional 
experience.  
Thus, whereas each of the individual studies does not provide sufficient evidence to make 
a strong case for the attention-focus hypotheses, their results converge across independent 
samples and different tasks. Thus, despite limitations of each of the studies, taken together the 
results provide empirical support of the attention-focus hypothesis.  The present findings thus 
complement physiological and brain research on the time course of emotional engagement, 
supplying information on the dynamics of self-reported affect when facing different laboratory 
and real-life situations. 
Results suggest that focusing attention on an emotion-eliciting event and the subsequent 
experiences increases the duration of self-reported affect, compared to conditions in which 
attention is diverted away from them. On a theoretical level, this implies that there might be a 
more parsimonious alternative explanation to the more complex adaptation models explaining 
the hedonic treadmill (see Frederick & Loewenstein, 1999). Providing empirical support for an 
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assumption that is often made in research on emotion regulation, it seems that emotional 
experience is affected by shifts of the focus of attention. Such a view is consistent with network 
models of emotion (e.g., Lang, 1993), which suggest that the emotional response to an event is a 
result of the complex interplay between perceptual representations, physiological reactivity, 
behavioral dynamics, and cognitive processes, including attention. The present attention-focus 
hypothesis suggests that it is not the strength or intensity of an event alone that determines the 
duration of the related emotions but that the duration of the affective response varies as a 
function of whether and how long it stays in the focus of attention.  This is consistent with the 
finding that some events such as marriage can exert long-lasting emotional effects (see Diener & 
Diener, 1996). Events that are related to many others in one’s everyday life (e.g., marriage) exert 
longer lasting emotional influences than equally intense events that are more isolated and hence 
are less likely to stay in or reenter one’s focus of attention. 
Many authors have discussed the lack of convergence between levels of emotional 
reactivity (Lang, 1993), and have emphasized that the level of subjective experience might not 
necessarily be correlated with other indices of emotional engagement, for instance physiological 
or behavioral measures (Frijda, 1988). In line with these notions, analysis of hedonic responding 
to events and stimuli over time has often suggested that informative differences between 
individuals and/or experimental conditions are reflected in time dynamics rather than in static 
measures of liking/disliking (Rozin, Ebert, & Schull, 1982).  
In sum, the present results are consistent with the notion that strong emotional events 
initially attract attention, possibly to allow prioritized responses to relevant situations. In 
addition, subsequent distraction may alter the duration of the initial emotional response, at least 
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on the level of subjective experience and affective report. In the present studies, this resulted in a 
more rapid decrease of reported affect in the distraction conditions. The rather slow time course 
of these changes supports the idea that competition for processing resources is a sustained 
interactive process in a highly complex system. Importantly, the present results, reflecting 
reactivity in a near-real-world setting, are consistent with laboratory research on emotion-
cognition interactions. In the laboratory, evidence for initial automatic emotion processing has 
been observed mainly with stimuli bearing high relevance for the observer such as affective 
scenes high in emotional arousal (Bradley, et al., 2003). By contrast, other experiments have 
suggested that the processing of emotional faces requires selective attention and suffers from 
demanding concurrent tasks (Pessoa, 2005). In terms of affective report in situations with high 
relevance to the participant, both processes seem to contribute to a temporal pattern as observed 
in our studies. This pattern is characterized by attending to the engaging event, but leaving 
behavioral flexibility to address concurrent requirements an individual faces, which then are at 
the cost of the subjective component of emotional engagement. Future research may address the 
question whether such time dynamics are related to depression and anxiety as well as the 
interplay of cognition and emotion.  
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Figure Captions 
Figure 1. 
Distraction leads to shorter duration of emotional experience than focusing attention on the 
eliciting event. Panel A: Pilot study – Attention focus maintains emotional experience after 
positive performance feedback longer than attention distraction. Panel B: Study 1 – Attention 
focus maintains emotional experience longer than attention distraction after winning a game of 
chess. Panel C: Study 2 -  Attention focus leads to longer duration of experiencing negative 
emotions after receiving negative performance feedback than distraction or waiting. 
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